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THE CHALLENGES OF REPRESENTING DETAINED
NONCITIZENS IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS
FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE DICKINSON SCHOOL
OF LAW IMMIGRATION CLINIC
Won Kidane*
I. INTRODUCTION
Persons deprived of their liberties as a result of administrative
detention for immigration reasons face a multitude of serious
challenges. There is currently no recognized right to government-
appointed representation in immigration proceedings.1 As a result,
only a very small percentage of immigrants obtain pro bono or any
other kind of legal representation. 2 This problem is compounded
by the fact that most immigration detainees are detained in remote
* Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, The Dickinson School of Law.
See Immigration and Nationality Act ("[NA"), ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163
(1952) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
In any removal proceedings before an immigration judge and in any appeal
proceedings before the Attorney General from any such removal proceedings,
the person concerned shall have the privilege of being represented (at no
expense to the Government) by such counsel, authorized to practice in such
proceedings, as he shall choose.
[NA § 292, 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (2006).
2 See UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM, REPORT ON ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL, VOL. 1:
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 34 (2005) (citing Susan Kyle, Cory Fleming
& Fritz Scheuren, Statistical Report on Immigration Proceedings, FY 2000-
2004, in REPORT ON ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL, VOL. II:




%201.pdf; see also Kate Jastram & Tala Hartsough, A-File and Record of
Proceeding Analysis of Expedited Removal, in UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON
INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, REPORT ON ASYLUM SEEKERS IN
EXPEDITED REMOVAL, VOL. II: EXPERT REPORTS 44, 56 n.34, available at
http://www.uscirf.gov/countries/global/asylum-refugees/2005/february/UCB%2
Oreport.pdf.
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rural areas where the private bar is virtually unavailable.3 Those
who are fortunate to obtain pro bono or other types of legal
representation also face some serious challenges at the different
stages of the deportation or removal proceedings.4 This article
discusses the challenges of representing detained noncitizens in
deportation proceedings from the prism of the Penn State
Dickinson School of Law's Immigration Clinic ("DSL Immigration
Clinic"). The discussion is presented in a continuum. Most of the
immigration detainees are placed in deportation proceedings after
serving a state or federal criminal sentence. What transpires in the
criminal proceedings often carries serious immigration
consequences. As such, the continuum must necessarily begin with
a discussion of the challenges faced in deportation proceedings as a
result of the nature of the state or federal criminal proceedings.
These challenges are discussed under the title "Pretrial Challenges"
in part II. Part III deals with the challenges associated with the
merits hearing in the removal proceedings, including procedural
and evidentiary issues. Part IV outlines posttrial challenges,
including prolonged detention and the complexities of obtaining
judicial review. Part V provides a brief conclusion.
3 Serena Hoy, The Other Detainees: Lost in the Protests About the
Detentions at Guantanamo Bay are 20, 000 Immigrants Held Behind Bars in the
United States, LEGAL AFF., Sept. - Oct. 2004, at 58, 59, available at
http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/September-October-
2004/review hoysepoct04.msp.
4 The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
("IIRIRA") of 1996 consolidated two proceedings formerly known as
"deportation" and "exclusion" into a single proceeding called "removal
proceeding." See IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-546, 3009-
607 to 3009-612 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 note). As a result of
this change, deportation as well as exclusion proceedings are now called
removal proceedings. Although the terms deportation and exclusion still have
significant relevance in immigration law, this article uses the term removal
proceedings to refer to both exclusion and deportation proceedings.
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II. PRETRIAL CHALLENGES
Most immigration detainees in expedited removal
proceedings, with the exception of new arrivals,5 tend to be
persons who have had criminal convictions in state or federal
6courts. This section briefly discusses the immigration
consequences of criminal convictions or plea bargains and
demonstrates the challenges that the detainees and their counsels
face during deportation proceedings because of the shortcomings
of such bargains.
A. Representation Challenges Posed by State and Federal
Criminal Plea Bargains
When immigrants are accused of criminal conduct, the penalty
that awaits them is not limited to incarceration for a certain period
of time or a fine under the applicable criminal laws; it often
includes deportation.7 Because deportation as a sanction is
imposed after a separate proceeding, namely removal proceedings
in immigration court, the consequences that criminal plea bargains
may have on subsequent immigration court proceedings are easily
overlooked. The immigration consequences could be very
dramatic. For example, under section 101(a)(43)(F) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), "a crime of violence...
5 For procedures of removing noncitizens arriving at ports of entry, see
INA § 241(c), 8 U.S.C. § 123 1(c) (2006).
6 The procedures for removing noncitizens convicted of committing
aggravated felonies are contained under INA § 238, 8 U.S.C. § 1228 (2006). For
example, subsection (a)(3)(A) of title eight of the United States Code provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Attorney General shall
provide for the initiation and, to the extent possible, the completion of
removal proceedings, and any administrative appeals thereof, in the case of
any alien convicted of an aggravated felony before the alien's release from
incarceration for the underlying aggravated felony.
8 U.S.C. § 1228(a)(3)(A) (2006).
7 Although, for jurisprudential purposes, deportation is considered a civil
sanction as opposed to a criminal punishment, there is no dispute about its
severity. For a thorough discussion of the nature of deportation in light of the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence in the last 150 years, see generally Won Kidane,
Committing a Crime While a Refugee: Rethinking the Issue of Deportation in
Light of the Principle Against Double Jeopardy, 34 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 383
(2007).
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for which the term of imprisonment [is] at least one year" is
considered an aggravated felony.8 An aggravated felony, in turn,
excludes a noncitizen from almost all forms of relief including
adjustment of status,9 cancellation of removal,10 voluntary
departure," and even asylum from persecution.
2
The casual use of the terms "crime of violence" and
"aggravated felony" might suggest that they refer to some serious
crimes such as murder, rape, robbery, or other violent crimes. For
purposes of immigration law, however, pulling someone else's hair
during a night club fistfight might qualify as an aggravated felony
barring almost all forms of relief.
This suggestion is based on the case of Mary Ann Gehris,
which was reported by Anthony Lewis of the New York Times.'
3
According to the report, as cited by Professor Legomsky, Mary
8 See INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) (2006).
9 See INA § 245(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (2006) (requiring that a person
must first be admissible to adjust status). For criminal grounds of
inadmissibility, see generally INA § 212(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2) (2006).
For criminal grounds of deportability, see generally INA § 237(a)(2), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2) (2006).
10 See 1NA § 240A(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (2006) (requiring that the
alien not be convicted of an aggravated felony).
" See INA § 240B(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(a)(1) (2006) (requiring that the
alien not be deportable under INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2006) relating to aggravated felony conviction).
12 Asylum is granted to a person who can demonstrate that he has a well-
founded fear of being persecuted because of his race, religion, nationality,
political opinion, or social group if returned to his home country or the place of
his habitual residence. See INA § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006);
INA § 208(b)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2) (2006). Even if a person meets the
well-founded fear standard, he may be excluded from asylum if, among other
things, he has committed a particularly serious crime. See INA
§ 208(b)(2)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2006). For purposes of asylum,
a particularly serious crime is defined in the following terms: "For purposes of
clause (ii) of subparagraph (A) [referring to particularly serious crime], an alien
who has been convicted of an aggravated felony shall be considered to have
been convicted of a particularly serious crime." INA § 208(b)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1 158(b)(2)(B)(i) (2006).
13 See STEVEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND
POLICY 562-63 (4th ed. 2005) (citing and discussing Anthony Lewis, This Has
Got Me in Some Kind of Whirlwind, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2000, at A 13; Anthony
Lewis, Measure of Justice, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2003, at A 13).
[Vol. 17
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Ann was adopted by United States-citizen parents when she was
two years old. 14 When she became of age, she got involved in a
fistfight at a nightclub with another woman who had been with
Mary Ann's boyfriend.' 5 For that offense, Mary Ann received a
suspended sentence of one year.' 6 The former Immigration and
Naturalization Service ("INS") instituted an action to remove her,
alleging that she had committed an aggravated felony under
section 101(a)(43)(F) of the INA, that is, a crime of violence for
which a sentence of one year is imposed.' 7 The fact that the
sentence was suspended is considered irrelevant for purposes of
immigration. 18
Although in this particular case the former INS decided not to
pursue the deportation proceedings in the face of heightened
publicity, there is no doubt that the law could have been interpreted
to exclude Mary Ann. There is also no doubt that during her
criminal trial or plea bargain, nobody thought about the
immigration consequences of the criminal proceedings. If she had
served eleven months and twenty-nine days, instead of negotiating
for a suspended sentence of one year, she could have easily
avoided the immigration consequences. A significantly lesser time
of actual incarceration would undoubtedly have been attractive to
the prosecutors.
A similarly tricky provision is section 101(a)(43)(G) of the
INA. It defines an aggravated felony as "a theft offense (including
receipt of stolen property) or burglary offense for which the term
of imprisonment [is] at least one year."' 9 Examples of the
application of this provision include the finding of an aggravated
20felony in situations of attempted possession of stolen property,
14 LEGOMSKY, supra note 13, at 562.
15 Id. at 563.
16 id.
"7Id.; see 1NA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(43)(F) (2006).
18 See INA § 101(a)(48)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(B) (2006) ("Any
reference to a term of imprisonment or a sentence with respect to an offense is
deemed to include the period of incarceration or confinement ordered by a court
of law regardless of any suspension of the imposition or execution of that
imprisonment or sentence in whole or in part.").
'9 See INA § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(43)(G) (2006).
2°In re Bahta, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1381, 1381 (B.I.A. 2000).
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possession of stolen mail, 21 ordinary theft,22 petit larceny,23 and,
most interestingly, shoplifting.2 4 In almost all of the cases cited in
connection with the various offenses, the major problem was the
disregard for immigration consequences during the criminal trials
or plea bargains. Again, in almost all of the cases, the plea could
have been reasonably negotiated to avoid immigration
consequences. Reasonable prosecutors willing to negotiate a one-
year suspended sentence would agree to a term of actual
incarceration for a significantly lesser period of time.
DSL Immigration Clinic's representation of a client in
deportation proceedings in York, Pennsylvania, offers a good
example of the unfortunate results of criminal plea bargains that do
not take immigration consequences into account and also the
challenges that they bring to immigration representation.
The case of Daniel Kim25 is described as follows for purposes
of demonstration. Daniel is a native of Cambodia. His family fled
Cambodia at a time when the Khmer Rouge was killing and
terrorizing ordinary Cambodians. When he was a young child, his
parents took him to a refugee camp in Thailand to shield him from
persecution. He lived in the refugee camp under very difficult
conditions for ten years. He was then resettled as a refugee in the
United States along with his family. Daniel did not speak any
English when he arrived in the United States. He found attending
school difficult and dropped out. He got involved in drug-related
offenses, none of them very serious. More than about a decade
after the two drug-related offenses, he was accused of possession
of stolen property in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. According to
Daniel, he purchased the car that gave rise to the criminal charges
without knowing that it was stolen. Regardless of the truth or
21 Randhawa v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 1148, 1151 (9th Cir. 2002).
22 Femandez-Ruiz v. Gonzales, 410 F.3d 585, 588 (9th Cir. 2005).
23 United States v. Graham, 169 F.3d 787, 789, 793 (3d Cir. 1999).
24 See United States v. Christopher, 239 F.3d 1191, 1192, 1194 (11 th Cir.
2001).
25 This case was litigated in open court in the years 2006-2007. Although
theoretically it is a matter of public record, his real name has been withheld to
protect his identity. The entire file of this case is available with the DSL
Immigration Clinic. All facts hereinafter pertaining to the Daniel Kim case are
taken from the case files located at the DSL Immigration Clinic.
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falsity of the allegations, however, he was counseled to plead
guilty in exchange for a lighter sentence. He received an
indeterminate sentence of six months to twenty-three months under
Pennsylvania's indeterminate-sentencing guidelines. Under
existing case law, for purposes of immigration law, in situations of
indeterminate sentencing, the maximum penalty is considered the
penalty actually imposed.26 That made him guilty of an aggravated
felony under section 101(a)(43)(G) of the INA, that is, a crime of
theft for which one year imprisonment is given. 2 7 This
classification virtually left him without any meaningful remedy.
28
He could have easily avoided the severe immigration consequences
if he had agreed to serve up to 364 days in prison, which would
certainly have been attractive to the prosecutors who agreed to give
him six to twenty-three months.
B. Futility of Pleading Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Save affirmative misrepresentation, failure to advise a client of
the immigration consequences of a conviction or a plea bargain is
considered a collateral issue and, as such, not an ineffective
26 See, e.g., Pichardo v. INS, 104 F.3d 756, 759 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding
that the maximum term of an indeterminate sentencing of a minimum and
maximum term is considered the actual sentence for purposes of defining an
aggravated felony).
27 INA § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(43)(G) (2006).
28 The only other forms of relief that were theoretically available to him
were withholding of removal under INA § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)
(2006) and relief under the Convention Against Torture ("CAT"). See
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, pt. 1, art. 3, June 26, 1987, U.N. Doc. A/39/51, reprinted in
UNITED NATIONS CENTER. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS, A
COMPILATION OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS 315, 316 (2002); see also
Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277,
§ 2242, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-822. Given his long time residence in the United
States and changed circumstances in Cambodia, and given the high standard of
proof for INA withholding or CAT relief, these forms of relief could not be
obtained. For the standard of proof, see generally, INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480
U.S. 421, 423 (1987) (holding that while the standard of proof for the
discretionary grant of asylum might be about ten percent, the standard of proof
for the mandatory relief of withholding of removal under INA § 241(b)(3), 8
U.S.C. § 123 1(b)(3) (2006), is "more likely than not").
2008] 397
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assistance of counsel in most jurisdictions. 29 For example, in its
2005 decision in Resendiz v. Kovensky, ° the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that failure of counsel to
advise of the immigration consequences of a criminal plea
arrangement is a collateral issue that cannot be considered a
violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.3' In United
States v. George,32 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit arrived at the same conclusion as far back as
1989. 33
Given the obvious nature of representation that indigent,
immigrant criminal defendants receive, the immigration impact of
this rule is not difficult to contemplate. Even in situations where
the assistance of counsel may be considered ineffective, pleading
this ground as an avenue of relief from deportation is often futile
because of several reasons. For example, in the Daniel Kim case
previously discussed, such a claim would have required the
representatives to go back to the state court of Pennsylvania in
Philadelphia, where he was convicted, and submit a motion to
vacate the plea based on ineffective assistance grounds. Assuming
that the motion would succeed, it would only mean that Daniel
would stand trial anew. A new trial would mean that he could be
convicted or exonerated. The more serious problem is, however,
that by the time the new trial is conducted, Daniel would have
served the maximum penalty possible under Pennsylvania law for
the crime that he was accused of because he would not be released
from prison during the criminal trial. 34 It is important to note that
by the time Daniel was initially put in deportation proceedings, he
had already served his initial time and also spent a significant
29 See United States v. Couto, 311 F.3d 179, 187-88 (2d Cir. 2002).
30 416 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2005).
3" Id. at 956-58.
32 869 F.2d 333 (7th Cir. 1989).
33 Id. at 337-38.
34 Although technically if the plea is vacated, it would mean that he would
no longer qualify as an aggravated felon and as such would not be subject to
mandatory detention under [NA § 236(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2006), he may
still be held without bond under INA § 236(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (2006) until
his guilt or innocence is adjudged again in state court. On top of this, he faces
state detention as well.
398 [Vol. 17
HeinOnline  -- 17 Widener L.J. 398 2007-2008
REPRESENTING DETAINED NONCITIZENS
amount of time in immigration custody. Going back to state court
for retrial would mean years of incarceration, regardless of his
guilt or innocence. Thus, the damage done at the initial plea
bargain stage is almost irreparable. That remains to be one of the
greatest challenges of attorneys representing immigrants put in
deportation proceedings-plea bargains that could have easily
been modified to avoid severe immigration consequences.
C. Ambiguities in Criminal Conviction Records
Ordinarily, a noncitizen "who admits having committed or
who admits committing acts which constitute the essential
elements of ... a crime of moral turpitude" or a violation of
controlled substance laws is deemed inadmissible.35 There are,
however, reasonable exceptions to this rule which mitigate the
harsh consequences. For example, the inadmissibility rule does not
apply to a person who committed only one crime of moral
turpitude when he was under the age of eighteen and more than
five years have passed between the commission of the crime and
the release from incarceration. 36 However, hopeless predicaments
often befall a person convicted of an aggravated felony because of
the reasons discussed in the previous subsection. Because of the
seriousness of the consequences, including the denial of
adjustment of status and the cancellation of removal and asylum,
the law requires an actual conviction rather than the mere
admission of the essential elements of an offense.37 The
31 See INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i) (2006). There is
no definition of the term "crimes of moral turpitude" under the INA. However,
courts have adopted this general definition: "An act of baseness, vileness, or
depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellow men,
or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and
duty between man and man." Wing v. United States, 46 F.2d 755, 756 (7th Cir.
1931); see also Tillinghast v. Edmead, 31 F.2d 81, 84 (1 st Cir. 1929) (Anderson,
J., dissenting); Coykendall v. Skrmetta, 22 F.2d 120, 120-21 (5th Cir. 1927);
Vidal y Planas v. Landon, 104 F. Supp. 384, 389 (S.D. Cal. 1952); United States
ex rel. Manzella v. Zimmerman, 71 F. Supp. 534, 537 (E.D. Pa. 1947); United
States ex rel. Ciarello v. Reimer, 32 F. Supp. 797, 798 (S.D.N.Y. 1940); United
States v. Carrollo, 30 F. Supp. 3, 6-7 (W.D. Mo. 1939).
36 INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 11 82(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2006).
37 See, e.g., INA § 240A, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)-(b) (2006) (providing that
cancellation of removal may not be granted to a person who has been convicted
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determination of whether there was a conviction for an aggravated
felony or not is not as easy as it might seem. Again, the Daniel
Kim case demonstrates the challenges in this area.
When Daniel pleaded guilty to the charge of possession of
stolen property, he thought that he was given probation, not an
actual sentence. His belief was justified because the order was
issued on a preprinted form under a heading "Certification of
Probation." In the probation certificate, the order reads: "placed the
defendant on probation/parole for," and a handwritten entry
following this sentence reads: "6-23 mos. immediate parole to US
Marshals. 3 8 This record was obtained by Daniel's counsel from
the clerk's office of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia
County, Pennsylvania. Because of the lack of clarity of the
conviction records, the case had to be adjourned three times for the
presentation of more evidence proving the nature of the sentence.
The determination of the nature of the sentence was quite essential
because under existing law, if the evidence suggested that the six
to twenty-three month sentence was probation rather than an actual
sentence, it would have meant that there was no conviction of an
aggravated felony.39 That in turn would have meant no deportation
for Daniel, because his crime was only considered an aggravated
felony because of the sentence, not the inherent nature of the
crime.40 If there was no conviction for an aggravated felony,
Daniel would have qualified for cancellation of removal because
of any aggravated felony); see also INA § 208(b)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(2)(B)(i) (2006) (providing that conviction of an aggravated felony is
considered a particularly serious crime baring the granting of asylum).
38 This certificate of probation is available on file with the DSL
Immigration Clinic. It is dated June 20, 2006, and duly signed.
39 See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez-Coronado, 419 F.3d 1090, 1093-94
(10th Cir. 2005) (holding that several years of probation cannot be considered an
actual sentence for purposes of determining whether the conviction constituted
an aggravated felony under section 101(a)(43)(F) of the INA); see also United
States v. Banda-Zamora, 178 F.3d 728, 730 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that a
sentence of probation cannot be considered a suspended sentence for purposes
of determining the meaning of aggravated felony).
40 See INA § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) (2006).
400 [Vol. 17
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he had lawful permanent resident status, which he had acquired as
a result of his refugee status as a child.4'
Three adjournments and more evidence later, the immigration
court became convinced that despite the confusion in the criminal
records, the sentence was an actual sentence rather than probation.
Daniel was finally ordered deported, having lost on every form of
relief under the immigration law.42 His deportation could indeed
have been avoided if the immigration consequences were
considered during the criminal proceedings and subsequent
recordkeeping.
D. Prosecutorial Discretion
Like any area of law enforcement, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement ("ICE") exercises tremendous prosecutorial
discretion with respect to the selection of cases that it decides to
prosecute. This prosecutorial discretion is virtually unreviewable.43
Although the exercise of prosecutorial discretion often follows
commonsense, reasonable minds can differ on the prosecutorial
decisions of some cases. The DSL Immigration Clinic faced only
one case in which it considered that the unnecessary harm it caused
outweighed any legitimate law enforcement benefits that it was
meant to serve. That case was the case of Halima Omar.44 Ms.
Omar was an elderly woman from The Republic of Mali. She was
granted asylum several years back on the basis of severe
persecution she had suffered in her country of origin over a period
41 See INA § 240A(a)(1)-(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(1)-(3) (2006) (excluding
a lawful permanent resident convicted of an aggravated felony from the relief of
cancellation of removal).
42 In this case, the Immigration Court rendered a written ruling. The court's
decision is available on file with the DSL Immigration Clinic.
43 See INA § 242(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (2006) ("Except as provided in
this section ... no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or
on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney
General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders
against any alien under this Chapter."); see also Reno v. American-Arab Anti-
Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 477-81 (1999).
44 Although this case was adjudicated in open court and as such is a matter
of public record, the real name of the respondent is withheld to protect her
identity. The entire case records are available on file with the DSL Immigration
Clinic.
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of several years. The nature of the persecution was such that it
included every conceivable form of violence and indignity. She
brought three of her teenage children to the United States right
after she was granted asylum. The children acquired derivative
status under section 208(b)(3) of the INA. Some years later, she
was implicated for fraudulent conduct and served a sentence of
more than one year. As soon as she completed serving her criminal
sentence, she was transferred to immigration custody. The
immigration service revoked her asylum on the basis of her
conviction,45 which qualified as a particularly serious crime for
purposes of exclusion from asylum,4 6 and put her in deportation
proceedings. Unfortunately, the revocation of her asylum status
also meant the revocation of her children's derivative asylum
status;a7 although they may be able to seek asylum on their own
based on the persecution they shared with their parents and
independently. Finally, because the persecution Ms. Omar suffered
was so severe, the court granted her withholding of removal under
8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). That could not, however, reinstate her
children's derivative asylum. The prosecutorial decision to revoke
her asylum, while it was reasonably clear that she would qualify
for withholding of removal, became a source of great hardship on
the part of four refugees, Ms. Omar and her three children.
Moreover, it probably consumed significant government resources,
including the expenses of detaining Ms. Omar for several months,
the adjudication of her claim, and also expenses associated with
the possible future adjudication of her children's asylum claims.
The legitimate law enforcement objective served in this case was
greatly outweighed by the unnecessary hardship caused to the
refugees, as well as the expenses incurred. The challenge, of
course, is that there is nothing that counsel and representatives
could do because the exercise of prosecutorial discretion is
unreviewable. Even if it were reviewable, in circumstances such as
this where the law perfectly allows the course of conduct the
41 See INA § 208(c)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1 158(c)(2)(B) (2006).
46 See INA § 208(b)(2)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2006); INA
§ 208 (b)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (b)(2)(B)(i) (2006) (providing that an
aggravated felony is considered a particularly serious crime for purposes of
asylum).
41 See 8 C.F.R. § 208.24(d) (2003); § 1208.24(d) (2005).
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prosecutors took, there is really nothing that could be done except
to seek the appropriate form of relief. But ultimately, the power
rests with the prosecutors. Experience suggests that they often
exercise it judiciously; however, not all prosecutorial decisions can
be praised as such. This case demonstrates the occasional flaws.
III. TRIAL CHALLENGES
Trial challenges in immigration cases are enormous and relate
to the inability to obtain evidence as a result of the respondent's
incarceration, as well as the informal procedural and evidentiary
rules. This part discusses these challenges.
A. Challenges in Obtaining Evidence as a Result of Mandatory
Detention
Detained immigrants often face difficulty producing evidence
because of their incarceration. They cannot go out and gather
documentary evidence from their homes and other places or
convince friends and family to testify on their behalf. This problem
is real. For example, one of the DSL Immigration Clinic's clients
was a forty-eight-year old man who was born in Mexico and lived
in the United States since age three, but whose citizenship was
48
uncertain. The DSL Immigration Clinic got involved at the
appellate level before the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA").
The client was put in deportation proceedings after serving a
sentence for criminal conduct. The client claimed United States
citizenship by virtue of his father's United States citizenship'which
was not disputed. The problem was, however, under section 301(g)
of the INA, for the client to acquire United States citizenship by
birth, his United States-citizen father must have resided in the
United States for a total period of five years, two of which after he
turned fourteen.49 The only issue in this case was the father's
residence in the United States during the qualifying time period.
Unfortunately for the client, his father died while the client was in
48 As of the writing of this article, this case is pending before the BIA. The
records are available on file with the DSL Immigration Clinic.
49 See INA § 301(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g) (2006).
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deportation proceedings before he had a chance to testify. 50 The
client was denied relief for lack of evidence and he appealed to the
BIA. In the process of writing the appellate brief, the student
representatives contacted the client's brother, per the request of the
client, and asked if he was willing to testify should the case get
remanded to the immigration court. The brother refused to testify
claiming that his brother only contacted him when he got in
trouble.' This is indicative of the fact that if he was not
incarcerated during his deportation proceedings, he could have
obtained sufficient evidence to prove his United States citizenship,
including convincing his brother and others to testify. It is quite
possible that United States citizens are in fact deported because
they are unable to produce evidence because of their incarceration
on immigration charges.
The only source of evidence that incarcerated persons could
produce without much difficulty is their own testimony. Self-
serving testimonial evidence is, of course, often very vulnerable
for a variety of reasons. The following subsection discusses the
challenges of testimonial evidence in immigration proceedings.
B. Credibility
When the only form of evidence is the respondent's testimony,
credibility means everything. Admittedly, even in ordinary civil
and criminal proceedings, vigorous and tactful cross examination
has the potential of undermining the credibility of totally honest
and truthful witnesses. In immigration proceedings, this situation is
compounded by various considerations. First of all, the rules on
credibility are very broad. The INA, as amended by the Real ID
Act of 2005, elaborates the credibility rule in many ways. This rule
makes it clear that "[t]here is no presumption of credibility"5 2 and
goes on to state that the trier of fact must consider "the totality of
50 Transcript of Hearing at 11, In re N.V. (2007). Transcript available on
file with the DSL Immigration Clinic.
51 See Affidavit of Student-Representative, Connie A. Gadell-Newton
(dated Nov. 9, 2007) filed with the BIA, available on file with the DSL
Immigration Clinic.
52 INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2006).
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the circumstances, and all relevant factors 5 3 to determine
credibility. Such factors include: "demeanor, candor, or
responsiveness ... the inherent plausibility of the applicant's or
witness's account, the consistency between the applicant's or
witness's written and oral statements ... the internal consistency of
each such statement, the consistency of such statement, [and] with
other evidence of record ... 
Although this rule seems to be reasonably calculated to
determine the credibility of a witness, particularly in refugee
situations, applicants are not usually well-equipped to present their
stories, even if completely true, in a manner that could pass this
test. Their demeanor might suggest lack of credibility in the eyes
of a judge who may not be familiar with the culture of the
applicant. Evidently, in some cultures, eye contact with a person in
an authority position may be interpreted as a sign of disrespect.
55
Similarly, a refugee may demonstrate lack of responsiveness for a
variety of reasons, which may have nothing to do with the
truthfulness of the story. There could also be various reasons for
inconsistencies between previous filings and live testimony, such
as bad counseling, language barriers, illiteracy, and even an
attempt to embellish the story out of desperation-even if the real
story would have sufficed for the grant of asylum.56 It is often
easier to impeach the credibility of a detained noncitizen. The
following subsections discuss the challenges in this area.
" INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2006).
14 INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2006).
55 See, e.g., Paul R. Tremblay, Interviewing and Counseling Across
Cultures: Heuristics and Biases, 9 CLINICAL L. REv. 373, 394 (2002) (citing
WANDA M. L. LEE, AN INTRODUCTION TO MULTICULTURAL COUNSELING 104-
13 (1999) (explaining that in Chinese and Japanese cultures avoiding eye
contact is considered a sign of respect)).
56 See Allen Keller et al., Evaluation of Credible Fear Referral Expedited
Removal at Ports of Entry in the United States, in REPORT ON ASYLUM SEEKERS
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i. Criminal Conviction as a Presumption of Lack of Credibility
Evidently, society regards a person once convicted of a crime
as a person of questionable character. The stigma continues to
affect that person's credibility not only in subsequent court
proceedings, but also in daily life. To avoid prejudice to such
persons in subsequent criminal proceedings, in ordinary criminal
proceedings, the disclosure of previous convictions is often
prohibited at least until the sentencing stage in most jurisdictions.57
However, such rules do not apply in immigration proceedings. 58 In
fact, the respondent is often put in removal proceedings precisely
because of the convictions. 9 If such person seeks asylum and
testifies on his own behalf, he obviously needs to overcome a
negative presumption that he suffers because of his criminal past.
The slightest inconsistency or contradiction could completely
damage the credibility of the respondent, even if the story is totally
accurate. It is not difficult to impeach a witness under these
circumstances, particularly because of the relaxed rules of
admissibility in removal proceedings.
C. Relaxed Rules of Procedure and Evidence
There are no meaningful limitations on the admissibility of
evidence in deportation proceedings except generally applicable
due process considerations. 60  The Immigration Regulations
provide for the admissibility of "any oral or written statement that
is material and relevant to any issue in the case previously made by
the respondent or any other person during any investigation,
examination, hearing, or trial" to impeach the credibility of the
respondent or his witnesses testifying in removal proceedings.
61
One of the most important tools used to impeach witnesses in
asylum proceedings is the presentation of airport interview
documents. Although reliability of airport interview documents
could be questioned for various reasons, these documents are
57 See FED. R. EvID. 609, 404(b).
58 See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.41 (2007).
59 See Murray v. Ashcroft, 285 F. Supp. 2d 664, 670 (E.D. Pa. 2003).
60 See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.7(a) (2007). For the due process exception see, for
example, Hassan v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 429, 435 (6th Cir. 2005).
61 8 C.F.R. § 1240.7(a) (2007).
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admissible without any restriction. 62 Evidently, airport interviews
tend to be quick and general. 63 The interviews occur immediately
upon arrival and under stressful situations. 64 Moreover, the casual
nature of the recordkeeping makes them more unreliable. 65 In fact,
in its 2005 report, the United States Commission on International
Religious Freedom identified some serious irregularities in airport
interviewing, which makes the records unreliable. 6 6 Despite that,
however, the rules allow the admissibility of such records in
removal proceedings, creating a serious challenge for respondents
as well as their representatives.
More importantly, conviction records containing graphic
details of the criminal conviction are often brought to the attention
of immigration judges under many circumstances. For example, in
one of the cases that the DSL Immigration Clinic represented, the
respondent, Ali Mohamed, was put in removal proceedings after
serving a term of imprisonment, which was less than five years, for
the offense of corrupting a child.67 He sought withholding of
removal because he was not qualified for asylum under section
208(b) of the TNA because his crime clearly qualified as an
aggravated felony. 68 The issue in this case was whether the crime
also excluded him from withholding of removal under section
241(b)!3) of the INA, which defines "a particularly serious
crime" 9 as "an aggravated felony (or felonies) for which the alien
has been sentenced to an aggregate term of imprisonment of at
least 5 years. ', 70 The same provision states that this minimum
threshold does not prevent the Attorney General (i.e., the
62 See, e.g., Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2004)
(holding that such records are generally admissible).
63 See id at 181.
64 See id. at 179.
65 See Keller et al., supra note 56, at 30.
66 Id
67 See the case of Ali Mohamed on file with the DSL Immigration Clinic.
The real identity has been withheld to protect identification.
68 See INA § 208(b)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(l)(A) (2006); see also INA
§ 208(b)(2)(A)-(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)-(B) (2006) (excluding a person
who has been convicted of a particularly serious crime from asylum and
defining a particularly serious crime as an aggravated felony).
69 1NA § 241(b)(3)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 123 1(b)(3)(B)(ii) (2006).
70 INA § 241(b)(3)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 123 1(b)(3)(B)(iv) (2006).
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immigration judge) "from determining that, notwithstanding the
length of sentence imposed, an alien has been convicted of a
particularly serious crime." 71 To determine whether a certain crime
is a particularly serious crime for purposes of withholding of
removal under section 241(b)(3) of the INA, immigration judges
need to look at the nature of the crime. 72 To do so they usually
examine the criminal records, including the charging documents,
and jury instructions.73 In most instances, the examination of
charging documents and other related records are prejudicial to the
respondent as they tend to expose unproven allegations described
in prosecutorial language. In the case of Ali Mohamed noted
above, all the criminal records were admitted as evidence. The
judge had to examine all the graphic details of the corruption of a
minor charge to determine whether the crime, although the penalty
was less than five years, constituted a particularly serious crime
under section 241(b)(3) of the INA. The details of the allegations
would obviously not help the respondent, whether they were true
or not; there is no rule that could be used to keep them out.
IV. POSTTRIAL CHALLENGES
The rendering of a removal order is unfortunately not the end
of the story; in fact, it is sometimes the beginning of a more serious
challenge. In ideal circumstances, the noncitizen would obtain
travel documents from the government of his home country, the
home country would agree to take him, and he would be deported
to that country without difficulty. Not infrequently, however, a
", INA § 241(b)(3)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(C) (2006).
72 See INA § 241(b)(3)(B)(ii)-(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii)-(C) (2006).
13 See, e.g., Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990). In Taylor,
the defendant was convicted of burglary in Missouri. The Missouri criminal
statute pertaining to burglary had multiple elements, some of which qualify as
crimes of violence, but some do not. Id. at 580, 599. In such circumstances, the
Court held that the immigration court may look at charging documents, jury
instructions, and the actual records to determine "all the elements of [the crime]
in order to convict the defendant." Id. at 602. See also United States v.
Landeros-Gonzales, 262 F.3d 424, 426 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Doe,
960 F.2d. 221, 224 (1st Cir. 1992) ("[W]here a single statutory provision defines
several different crimes ... a court may have to look at the indictment ... to see
which of the several different statutory crimes ... was at issue.").
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number of serious challenges arise. This part discusses those
challenges.
A. Enforcement of Deportation Orders
Section 241 of the INA sets forth the rules that need to be
followed for the removal of aliens ordered removed.74 The
statutory removal period is ninety days; 75 however, a more
stringent rule applies to "inadmissible or criminal aliens. 76 It
states that
[a]n alien ordered removed who is inadmissible under section
212, removable under section 237(a)(1)(C), 237(a)(2), or
237(a)(4) or who has been determined by the Attorney General
to be a risk to the community or unlikely to comply with the
order of removal, may be detained beyond the removal period
and, if released, shall be subject to the terms of supervision in
paragraph (3).77
In situations where no state wants to receive their would-be
deportee, the consequence could be indefinite detention, at least in
some cases.
78
Although in Zadvydas v. Davis,79 the Supreme Court of the
United States held that indefinite detention of noncitizens ordered
removed when there is no possibility of removal violated due
process, it failed to make this rule applicable to all cases.8" One
obvious exception is considerations of dangerousness. Based on
this gap, the Immigration Regulations carved out four possible
exceptions to the Zadvydas "No Indefinite Detention Rule." These
exceptions include: (1) people afflicted with highly contagious
diseases; (2) people whose release would have adverse foreign
policy consequences; (3) people who are considered significant
74 See generally INA § 241, 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (2006) (addressing the
detention and removal of aliens ordered removed).
71 INA § 241(a)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 123 1(a)(1)(A) (2006).
76 INA § 241(a)(6), 8 U.S.C. § 123 1(a)(6) (2006).
77 INA § 241(a)(6), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (2006).
78 See INA § 241, 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (2006).
'9 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
'o Id. at 682, 690-95.
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national security risks including terrorists; and, finally, (4) people
who are considered "specially dangerous" because of their
conviction for crimes of violence or because of mental
conditions.
8 1
As described above, the meaning of crimes of violence,
aggravated felony, and related concepts in immigration law is a
little different than in other areas of jurisprudence. Given the
breadth of the exceptions under the regulations, indefinite or
prolonged detention of those not only genuinely considered to be
dangerous, but also those who are deemed dangerous just because
they meet the board interpretation of the regulations, would be
unavoidable. For example, in the case of Ali Mohamed cited
above, as of the writing of this article, the respondent was awaiting
his removal about a year after the final removal order was entered.
He must have been released under Zadvydas, but obviously one of
the four exceptions under the regulations must have been invoked
to keep him in detention. The only way that the actual reasons for
holding this individual for nearly a year could be ascertained is
through habeas corpus. This will lead to the discussion of judicial
review in the next subsection.
B. Judicial Review
In recent years, the United States Congress took several
measures to curtail judicial review of immigration decisions in
many ways. The evolution of judicial review in the immigration
context is a complex subject and is outside the scope of this
article. 2 However, it is necessary to state the existing law to show
the challenges that noncitizens ordered deported, and their
representatives, routinely face. The general rule on judicial review
of deportation orders based on criminal convictions is stated as,
"Notwithstanding any other provision of law ... no court shall
have jurisdiction to review any final order of removal against an
81 See 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(b)-(d), (f) (2007).
82 For good discussion of some aspects of judicial review in the
immigration context, see generally Stephen H. Legomsky, Fear and Loathing in
Congress and the Courts: Immigration and Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV.
1615 (2000).
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alien who is removable by reason of having committed a criminal
offense." 83 The exception is stated in the following terms:
Nothing in subparagraph (B) or (C), or in any other provision
of this Act (other than this section) which limits or eliminates
judicial review, shall be construed as precluding review of
constitutional claims or questions of law raised upon a petition
for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals in
accordance with this section.
A petition for review in an appellate court is thus the only way
that a final removal order could be reviewed. Even then, the review
is limited to constitutional issues and questions of law.
85
Determinations of fact including credibility, consistency, and
sufficiency of evidence are almost always never reviewable.
86
Thus, a respondent who loses on factual findings at the trial level
does not have any avenues of review unless, of course, the
circumstances compel a contrary finding. 87 This is a very difficult
burden to meet. It is fair to conclude that the chance of having a
reversal on an appeal on questions of fact is close to none. Even
when questions of law arise, the practical difficulty of proceeding
with an appeal before an appellate court is a daunting task not only
for the respondent, but also for his representatives. Unless some
serious legal and constitutional issues are involved, the whole
process of judicial review is so discouraging, particularly when the
chances of success are balanced with the procedural hurdles and
83 INA § 242(a)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) (2006).
84 INA § 242(a)(2)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) (2006).
85 INA § 242(a)(2)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) (2006).
86 For questions of fact, even the BIA employs the very deferential "clearly
erroneous" standard. See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FACT SHEET: BOARD OF
IMMIGRATION APPEALS: FINAL RULE at 3 (2002),
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/press/02/BIARulefactsheet.pdf.
87 This is particularly so in asylum situations. In INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502
U.S. 478, 483-84 (1992), the Supreme Court held that courts may only reverse
factual findings if the evidence presented is so compelling that no reasonable
fact finder would have found the way the lower court found. See also INA
§ 242(b)(4)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (2006).
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attending costs. A limited number of cases do, however, get
appealed and continue to shape the jurisprudence in this area.88
V. CONCLUSION
Involvement in the representation of noncitizens in expedited
removal proceedings would provide the opportunity to observe the
administration of an interesting brand of justice; the kind of justice
that appears to balance humanitarianism with swift law
enforcement. The balance is delicate. The guidance that decision-
makers get from the substantive and procedural laws is less than
perfect. The balance often shifts from one side to the other
depending on circumstances. Administrative hurdles such as
obtaining accurate criminal conviction records, plea bargains that
do not take immigration consequences into account, lack of
evidence, presumptions, relaxed rules of evidence and procedure,
and lack of cooperation from countries of origin of persons ordered
removed continue to complicate the administration of justice in
immigration proceedings. In the end, however, the mix of variables
that would determine the dispensation of justice in removal
proceedings being too many, a not so unimportant variable seems
to be good or bad luck.
88 Although in recent years the number of appeals to the courts of appeals
has grown significantly, it is still a fraction of the total number of cases
adjudicated by the nations approximately 220 immigration judges. See Adam
Liptak, Courts Criticize Judges' Handling of Asylum Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
26, 2005, at Al (reporting that in the year 2004, "Immigration cases, most
involving asylum seekers, accounted for about 17 percent of all federal appeals
cases").
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